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Abstract—Mobile users are increasing fast in numbers, new
types of services and applications become available, and new
mobile systems (e.g., for intelligent transportation) emerge. Mean-
while, the need for securing communication in such large scale,
highly dynamic systems grows. But the organizational complexity
and operational costs make traditional security solutions hard to
deploy at the rate new mobile applications are rolled out. The
challenge that lies ahead is how to provide versatile security
compatible with the large deployed mobile networking infras-
tructure. We propose a novel approach to establish cryptographic
keys. Our basic observation is that users are often very mobile
and, as they interact with the infrastructure, each of them can
leave a unique trace behind. Unlike many works that seek to
identify structure in the mobility of a population, we leverage
the inherent randomness of the mobility of individuals (and thus
the randomness of mobile-infrastructure interactions) to establish
shared secret keys between each mobile node and the infrastruc-
ture. With an underlying readily available source of uncertainty,
such keys can be generated as needed, on the fly, to enhance the
system and user security in many ways. We find that with no
or little change to existing mobile communication systems, users
can generate a common secret with the infrastructure at a rate
of roughly 0.1 bits per second.
I. INTRODUCTION
A core requirement for future wireless systems is to support
communication for large numbers of mobile users, while still
offering security and privacy. Nowadays, users are eager to use
their smart phones for a multitude of services and applications:
data access while commuting to work, social networking,
urban sensing, and vehicular communications. Connectivity to
fixed networking infrastructures gets more and more extensive,
and interactions with other users become less rigid and more
ad-hoc. As we move from traditional cellular telephony to
more fluid and mobile settings, it becomes increasingly im-
portant and difficult to achieve security and privacy.
A common denominator in today’s approaches for security
and privacy is that mobility is treated as a hurdle to overcome,
a challenge for the system’s performance or even functionality.
Consider for example public key infrastructures (PKIs), a
long-known yet complex to organize solution: In large-scale
dynamic systems, with multiple domains (as is the case for
cellular and vehicular communication systems), special care
must be given to the setup and the ability to authenticate
any entity from any other domain. Thus far, deployed cel-
lular data and voice systems have not adopted PKIs; rather,
they rely on symmetric key authentication methods based on
pre-established secrets (SIM cards) and cross-organizational
verification of identity and authorization (e.g., for billing and
accounting).
The need for alternative methods for key management,
notably in the wireless domain, spurred a recent trend: to
exploit the physical layer communication as a source of
randomness for secret key generation. A number of schemes,
surveyed in Sec. VI, leverage the wireless channel variability
so that two nodes in range of each other utilize reciprocal
observation of signals to establish a shared secret key.
Our work is close in spirit, even though we propose a
fundamentally different approach: to leverage mobility and
its inherent randomness as the basis for key generation. Our
starting point is that users are often quite mobile and in most
cases they interact with networking infrastructures; in doing
so, each of them leaves behind a unique trace. Many works
seek to identify structure in the mobility of a population,
to anticipate user mobility and offer services. Instead, we
exploit the inherent randomness of each individual mobility
trace. For example, the sequence of base stations a driving
user’s smart phone connects to and the times these encounters
occur constitute shared information between the user and the
infrastructure.
It is this information exactly that allows establishing a
shared secret, and also renew it over time, simply thanks to
the user mobility. Having such a source of secret keys opens
a new range of opportunities for users to address security
and privacy needs, complementing existing techniques. In this
paper, we investigate the feasibility of this novel approach and
we shed light on what rates of secrecy can be achieved. Our
main contributions are:
1) A new approach for secret key generation, applicable to
a wide range of systems that involve mobile nodes and a
wireless communication infrastructure. We investigate design
choices and propose a backward compatible protocol with low
overhead cost for existing cellular systems.
2) The performance evaluation of our scheme, through an-
alytical modeling as well as simulations. We find that over
a practically acceptable period of time a mobile node and
an entity on the back-end of the infrastructure can derive
common information, sufficient for establishing a strong secret
shared key; most notably so, even in the presence of a strong
adversary.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
describes the main idea behind our approach, and introduces
basic definitions; Sec. III presents our protocol design and
implementation; Sec. IV introduces our analytical model;
Sec. V presents our evaluation; Sec. VI surveys related work
and discusses the positioning of our work; and Sec. VII
concludes the paper.
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Figure 1. Bob’s (the mobile’s) itinerary in the area of Alice (the infrastruc-
ture), which operates the four base-stations, A,B,C, and D.
II. MAIN IDEA AND SETUP
Currently, mobility is perceived primarily as a hurdle to be
overcome in mobile computing systems that need to support
secrecy and secure communication. Our position is that, on the
contrary, mobility can be a source of secrecy and thus enable
security enhancements. Moreover, such enhancements can be
achieved using simple schemes, building on well-established
existing infrastructure. We illustrate next our approach assum-
ing a cellular infrastructure.
A. Main Idea
Consider a user, Bob, who enters a geographical area
at some time t0 and drives around until he exits the area
at a later time tE. His itinerary can be described by his
geographical position at each time t within the interval of
interest, t0 ≤ t ≤ tE. Let lx(t) and ly(t) be continuous random
variables describing his (lx, ly) coordinates at time t; then,
L(t) = (lx(t), ly(t)) is a continuous-time stochastic process
that describes Bob’s itinerary. Fig. 1 depicts a curve L(t).
Our first observation is that such a curve has inherent
randomness: even if this is the itinerary Bob uses on an every
day basis, e.g., to commute to work, he may not use the exact
same roads; even if he does use the same roads, he may not
start at exactly the same time, as he may encounter different
traffic conditions. Thus, he will not be at the same positions at
the exact same times. Our second observation is that, currently,
infrastructures for mobile communications already have some
knowledge regarding this itinerary, or they could readily record
such information in detail with little effort. This knowledge we
can exploited to form the basis of a common secret, between
Bob and Alice, the infrastructure.
Consider a cellular infrastructure and assume that our area
is covered by four base-stations, A, B, C and D, as shown
in Fig. 1. As Bob moves, his mobile device is at any time
connected to one of these base stations,1 depending on his
location and the signal strength. This is information that both
Bob and the cellular infrastructure have or can easily record.
For example, Bob enters the cell of base-station A at time
t0 = 0, base-station B at t1 = 3, basestation D at time t2 = 5
1Although in practice Bob may be connected to more than one base-stations,
for example during soft hand-off, there exists always a single primary base
station, the one responsible for the signaling.
returns to A at time t3 = 7, then proceeds to base-station
C at time t4 = 8, etc. That is, we can in a sense2 map L(t)
into another stochastic process X(t), which describes the base
station that Bob is connected to at time t. X(t) offers a view of
Bobs itinerary as perceived by the cellular infrastructure. Note
that X(t) takes values in the finite set M = {A,B,C,D},
while the time variable t is continuous.
Our goal is to exploit the common knowledge of X(t)
between Alice (the infrastructure) and Bob (the mobile), in
order to build a practical protocol. We thus first sample X(t)
every δs sec to create the discrete signal
X[i] , X(iδs),
and then we keep n samples X[i] in a vector
X , [X[0], X[1], . . . X[n− 1]]. (1)
This vector is what our protocol uses as a shared secret
between Bob and the infrastructure. For example, in Fig. 1,
if starting at time t0 = 0 we sample X(t) every δs = 1
sec and keep n = 9 values we get the vector X1 =
[A A A B B D D A C] while if we sample every 2.5
sec and keep 4 values we get the vector X2 = [A A B A].
Note how the sampling period δs affects the observed vectors
X1, and X2; for example, one cannot tell that X1 and X2
come from sampling the same stochastic process X(t). In the
evaluation of our protocol, we will investigate its performance
as a function of the sampling interval δs.
B. Adversary
The need for key establishment and secrecy implies the
presence of an adversary, Eve, any entity that wishes to obtain
the key shared by Alice and Bob. In our context, the adversary
could attempt to learn the vector X , and from this derive
the secret key. To do so, Eve would need to eavesdrop Alice
and Bob exchanges over a long period of time, intercepting
messages and recording the times Bob is connected with each
base station, in order to establish X . In fact, Eve would have
to achieve this in spite of fluctuations of the wireless links,
impairments of the wireless communication between Bob and
base stations, the uncertainty on the choice of base station
(recall: Bob may choose among multiple base stations within
range), and the time of the Alice-Bob key establishment.
We assume that Eve is a passive eavesdropper that can
have presence in the area of Alice, i.e., covered by the
infrastructure nodes. Her presence, e.g., through the deploy-
ment of own eavesdropping devices, is assumed bounded, that
is, within a part of the entire area, however, she may be
able to eavesdrop communication with multiple base stations.
Assuming an arbitrary non-unique label assignment to all base
stations, we consider Eve an adversary that can intercept all
communication between Bob and all base stations with the
same label. We emphasize that all means literally all messages
2There is a degree of randomness in this mapping. Bob may at the same
location connect to different base stations depending on the channel conditions
and the traffic the base stations support; however, X(t) itself contains a large
amount of randomness, and this is what we want to exploit.
3(in spite of practical wireless channel and other limitations),
thus being a worst-case scenario for our scheme.
This is a particularly strong adversary. As it will become
clear in Sec. IV and Sec. V, the base station labeling we
consider is such that Eve can intercept all messages to 25% of
all base stations. Consider for example a medium size country
and one major cellular telephony and data provider with more
than 3000 base stations (in with 38 Location Areas and each
base station with multiple cells): capturing all activity in more
than 750 base stations (or more than 2000 cells) implies ample
resources for the adversary.
C. Performance Metrics
In order to evaluate the quality of our key, we need to
quantify the inherent randomness in the collected vectors X .
If the basestation are assigned labels from a setM of size m,
then we can consider this vector X to be a discrete random
variable that takes mn values.
A vector is considered to be truly random if it is not
compressible; i.e., there is no scheme, which in average assigns
a shorter description to the vector than the vector itself. This is
the case if each element X[i] of the vector is chosen uniformly
at random from the set M, and as a result, X takes the mn
values with equal probability. In this case, we say that the
vector carries n log2(m) bits of information (this is the amount
of information we need to describe the vector in average). In
general, the value of consecutive elements (X[i] and X[i+1])
might be dependent, which reduces the uncertainty contained
in the vector X . The incompressibility or inherent randomness
of a vector can be characterized by its entropy [1].
Definition 1 (Entropy H(X)) Let X be a discrete random
variable with distribution p. The entropy is defined by:
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log2 p(x).
How does this entropy behave if we consider vectors of
larger and larger size? Or otherwise put, how much entropy do
we gain if we add one sample to an already long vector. This is
characterized by the entropy rate. For a stationary process the
entropy rate is a lower bound on the entropy of a finite vector,
normalized by its length. This is intuitive since the entropy
rate takes all dependencies into account, even those that go
beyond the boundary of the vector. For very large vectors, the
two become identical. The entropy rate is therefore the most
fundamental measure.
Definition 2 (Entropy Rate H(X)) Consider a stochastic
process that corresponds to a vector X of infinite length. The
entropy rate of X is then defined as
H(X) = lim
n→∞
1
n
H(X[1], X[2], . . . , X[n]).
This limit exists for a stationary process.
In the sense of the above limit, if we use vectors of length n,
where n is large, H(X) ≈ nH(X). Since Bob and Alice know
X , they can create H(X) truly random bits in common, using
one of the standard methods in the literature (e.g., [2]). In other
words, they can create a secret key of length H(X) bits. If we
assume that we collect one element every δs seconds, and if
we consider a long vector, then we can achieve a secrecy rate
of Rs =
H(X)
δs
bits per second.
To quantify how much information an eavesdropper Eve
learns regarding X , assume that Eve collects vectors A that are
correlated to X (if we view again vectors X and A as discrete
variables, their relationship can be captured through their
joint distribution). We can then use the conditional entropy
to learn how much information is in X that we cannot learn
by observing A.
Definition 3 (Conditionally Entropy H(X | A)) Let X and
A be two discrete random variable with joint distribution p.
The conditional entropy is then defined by:
H(X | A) = −
∑
(x,a)∈(X,A)
p(x, a) log2 p(x | a).
D. Why a new scheme for key generation?
The nearly pervasive wireless communication infrastruc-
tures (cellular, WiFi, mesh networks) offer a first-class op-
portunity: they are already capable of collecting data on the
connectivity of mobile devices, in fact, as part of their regular
operation in order to support their users. At the same time,
mobile devices can also easily determine which infrastructure
node they are connected to. In other words, our vectors X can
be collected without any special purpose infrastructure.
Equally important, unlike the vast majority of alternative
solutions (Sec. VI), our scheme is independent of the wireless
communication technology itself and it does not require any
modification of the mobile or infrastructure transceivers.
Moreover, it does not depend on low-level, at the wireless
physical layer, measurements, thus it can enable key establish-
ment between the mobile user device and a server “behind”
the wireless infrastructure; this would not be possible with
methods that leverage the wireless channel properties.
Finally, mobility can be an incessant source of randomness
and thus secrecy: users can get essentially “for free” a key
established while on the move. Further, they can have a
continuous accumulation of secret bits over time, and refresh
older (and perhaps compromised) keys; along the lines of
the idea to recover loss of secrecy with newly dynamically
established secrets [3].
III. OUR SCHEME
Our scheme establishes a secret key between two entities:
(i) The infrastructure-side entity, S, any machine (e.g.,
server) that lies on the back side of the wireless infrastruc-
ture (i.e., the wire-line network). The wireless infrastructure
consists of a set of base stations, {I}, distributed across a geo-
graphical area, connected with wire-line links and nodes, such
as routers and switches. S can access the {I} infrastructure.
(ii) A mobile node, V , that roams in the geographical
area covered by {I}. V can connect to base stations in {I}
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link protocol to mitigate communication errors. Over time, V
connects to multiple base stations, one at a time.
Each base station is assigned a label from a set M. The
base station labeling is known in advance to both S and V .
Multiple base stations may be assigned the same label.
Trace Collection: To generate a shared key, V and S
need to collect a trace of data on the connectivity of V
with base stations in {I}. This is initiated by the mobile,
V , which asks for the bilateral data collection by sending
an Initiate (V, TI , TE , δs) message to S. Upon receipt, S
notifies V if it accepts or rejects this request. If accepted,
logging of V ↔ I connections starts at time TI , with one
sample every δs seconds, and ends at time TE . Let X(t)
be the stochastic process describing the label of the base
station that V is connected to at time t. The collected samples
X[i] = X(iδs) are stored in a what we term the trace
vector X = [X[0], X[1], . . . X[n − 1]], where n = Tδs and
T = TE − TI is the total sampling duration.
The samples are retained with appropriate logging at S and
V , at each predefined time, t, and for each sample. V is in
direct contact with one base station, and S retrieves the V ↔ I
connection information from the infrastructure (Note: this is
either available at the side of the infrastructure or a low-cost
probe can be triggered by S).
Trace Consolidation: V and S need to consolidate their
traces, i.e., account for any errors in the trace creation, so that
the key extraction is done on the same trace. Let XV and
XS be the traces on the mobile’s and the infrastructure’s sides
respectively. An error occurs, if these differ in one or more
positions. To detect and correct errors, we establish a short
V ↔ S communication (shortly after time TE). To reveal
minimal information about XV and XS during consolidation,
even in the presence of an adversary that perfectly intercepts
the communication, well-known mechanisms for privacy am-
plification [4] can be used.
Key Extraction: Finally, S and V use the common informa-
tion, XS (which is identical to XV ) to derive a shared secret
key KV,S . Both parties implement a set of hash functions,
agreed upon in advance from an appropriate class of hash
functions (see universal-2 class [5] and [6], [7]). The output
fH(XS) = fH(XV ) is XOR-ed with a predefined string, K0
of the same length, to obtain
KS,V = K0xorfH(XS). (2)
K0 can be publicly known, and can be fixed (e.g., a function
of the V and S identities).
The secret key extraction capitalizes on the randomness
in the V mobility pattern to create random bits. Part of the
mobility pattern is the amount of time V spends connected
to a particular base station before switching. We term this
the sojourn time S, a random variable with a probability
distribution that depends on the application, the system, and
the user. The sojourn time distribution forms an input to our
scheme design, used to assign values to its basic parameters.
Design Parameters: The trace collection is controlled by
three basic parameters:
1) The alphabet size, i.e., the size of the set M, or the
number of distinct labels we assign to the base stations.
2) The sampling interval δs, i.e., how often we sample.
3) The sampling duration T = TE −TI , i.e., for how long
we sample.
Parameter choice guidelines: (1) We propose to employM
of a size equal to the maximum number of neighbors a base
station can have; and a labeling that assigns a different label
to each neighbor. This stemmed from our analysis, in Sec. V,
as such alphabets yield the same amount of randomness with
larger ones (e.g., with a distinct label for each base station),
while allowing reduced storage and processing complexity.
Knowledge of the infrastructure deployment statistics suffice
for that purpose. (2) We suggest to select a sampling interval
of the same order of magnitude as the average sojourn time.
Without considering wireless radio peculiarities, this would
capture the mobility induced randomness. Coarse knowledge
on the mobility patterns of users or even better statistics on the
connectivity to {I} can give guidelines for this. (3) Finally,
the sampling duration T can be selected sufficiently large, to
allow to extract the required number of random bits.
Other practical considerations: The trace collection re-
quires that S and V have their clocks synchronized. S and
all base stations in {I} can be synchronized with the help
of existing protocols (e.g., the Internet standard Network
Time Protocol (NTP), and V can be synchronized with the
base station it connects to. Synchronization cannot be perfect,
however, as clock errors are in principle much smaller than
the sampling intervals we consider; thus, the resultant small
amount of potential errors can be overcome with the help of
trace consolidation.
Example of Infrastructure Compatible Deployment: The
information we require is simple to obtain in any wireless com-
munication infrastructure, as they all uniquely identify their in-
frastructure nodes and they can probe them, and through them
the connectivity of mobile nodes. A characteristic example is
that of cellular voice and data networks, e.g., GSM/GPRS [8],
[9] and UMTS [10]. As they are a widely deployed, essentially
pervasive, we discuss our scheme in their context.
At any point in time, the mobile can determine the identity
of the cell it is connected to. Recall that each base station
(BTS in GSM terminology) has typically 3 cells. Thus, our
XS vector will be composed of cell identities (Cell IDs). Each
Cell ID is periodically broadcasted, thus the mobile can easily
identify all cells in range and elect the one it considers as
a connection. Existing operating systems for mobile devices
(e.g., Android) provide the appropriate interface for the mobile
to obtain easily this information.
On the other hand, the V connectivity is maintained only
when the mobile initiates or receives a call or sends/receives
data. While this case and in order to maintain the end-to-end
connectivity of the mobile, the infrastructure keeps closely
track of all changing connections of the mobile. Otherwise,
to reduce signaling overhead when the mobile is idle, the
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to) is updated only when the mobile crosses the boundary
of the so-called location areas. As those areas are typically
large (depending various parameters, but typically from 30 to
400 cells per area), having only such infrequent updates would
yield little information for our purpose.
We can resort to two alternative simple solutions to have
up-to-date information for the trace collection of our scheme.
First, the mobile, V , can transmit a short message (e.g., a
data packet or SMS to a predefined “sink” node) shortly
before the time of the i-th trace sample. This way, V ensures
that the infrastructure has available the appropriate connection
data sample. All that S would need to do is to probe the
Mobile Switching Center (MSC) and/or the Visitor Location
Register (VLR) to obtain the cell ID (and convert it to its
label through our mapping). Another approach would be to
have the S initiate a probe shortly before the time of the i-
th trace sample. This is possible with little cost, for example,
by using the method of [11], which sends a special-purpose
void SMS message to the mobile V ; this does not disturb
the user but still triggers an update of its “location”, i.e., the
Cell ID, at the side of the infrastructure. Finally, note that
the openness of cellular infrastructures to such extraction of
information by third parties is already a fact, e.g., for tracking
of cell phones by specialized services, through the opening of
specific interfaces, or for provision of location based services.
IV. MODELING AND ANALYSIS
Let us now introduce a model that allows us to analyze the
performance of a given system, i.e., the quality of the produced
key. The performance metrics we use are entropy and entropy
rate (see Sec. II). Our model takes as input the sojourn time
distribution and calculates the entropy and entropy rate of
the resulting traces. More precisely, we model the collected
vectors as being produced by a renewal process, where the
inter arrival times of the renewal process are equal to the
sojourn times. We consider both the cases where an adversary
is present or not.
We validate our model in Sec. V, using as input the sojourn
time distribution we collect from simulated traces. More
precisely, we compare in Sec. V the analytic performance
predictions with the results form actual simulations. We find
very good agreement.
A. Model
Recall that X(t) is the stochastic process describing the
labels of the base station that user Bob is connected to at time
t, and X is the trace of length n
X = [X[0], X[1], . . . X[n− 1]], (3)
where X[i] = X(iδs) and δs is the sampling interval. The
randomness of the trace X is due to the randomness in the
routes and also due to the random amount of time users are
connected to various base stations. The process X(t) is quite
complicated, and so is X . Let us therefore introduce a model
which is analytically more tractable but preserves the key
characteristics of X(t).
Also recall that the sojourn time S is the random variable
that describes the amount of time that a user spends connected
to a particular base station before switching. For a fixed
sampling period δs, we measure the sojourn time in multiples
of δs, i.e., S ∈ N δs. E.g., S = 3δs means that for 3
consecutive sampling times a user is connected to a particular
base station, but that at the 4-th sampling time instance he
has switched. Our model takes as input the distribution of S
for a given parameter δs; this can be calculated either through
simulations, or through modeling.
Definition 4 (Interarrival Times U ) As mentioned above, S
takes values in N δs. Associate to S the integer-valued random
variable U , where pi = P (U = i) = P (S = iδs), i ≥ 1. We
call U the inter-arrival time.
We now postulate that we can model the connection process by
a renewal process with inter-arrival times distributed according
to U . With respect to the labels we assume that for every
new connection the label is chosen uniformly at random from
the label set M. This is a reasonable model if we assume
that we choose a relatively small label set. Why would we
be content with using a small label set? The analysis shows
that a significant source of randomness is contained in the
“timing” information. Further, one would expect that even if
we assigned unique labels to each base station the amount of
randomness does not significantly increase. This is true since,
given the identity of a base station, we know its location, and
for reasonably sampling intervals δs, the “next” base station
will very likely be one of its nearest neighbors. This number of
neighbors is typically small (perhaps 4) and it is this number
and not the absolute number of base stations which limits the
entropy rate. Given these considerations we will stick to small
label sets. This might be beneficial also in terms of storage
and processing.
Definition 5 (Renewal Process R and Label Process Y )
Let R denote a renewal process with inter-arrival
times distributed like U . More precisely, let FU (x)
denote the distribution function corresponding to U . Let
GU (x) =
1
µp
∫ x
z=0
(1 − FU (z))dz. Let U1 be distributed
according to GU and let U2, U3, . . . denote a sequence of
independent random variables, distributed according to FU .
Let R0 = 0 and Rn =
∑n
i=1 Ui, n ≥ 1.
Let Y [i] denote our analytical model for X[i]. We pick
Y [Rn], n ≥ 0, uniformly at random from M. For i ∈
[Rn + 1, . . . , Rn+1 − 1], we define Y [i] = Y [Rn]. Finally,
define Y as Y , [Y [0], Y [1], . . . Y [n− 1]]. As for X we call
Y the trace.
Discussion: The reason we have chosen the distribution of U1
in this particular way (and different from the distribution of
all other Ui) is that this choice makes the process stationary.
In particular, for i ≥ 0 the process as defined behaves as if the
6renewal process had started in the infinite past. This simplifies
our analysis.
Definition 6 (Adversary Process) Let the trace for the user
be as in (3). We assume that the (strong) adversary is present
in all base stations having a specific label mi ∈ M, i.e., the
adversary is present in a fraction 1m of all base stations. The
process A for the strong adversary is then defined as
A[j] =
{
0, if Y [j] 6= mi,
1, if Y [j] = mi.
The stochastic process of the strong adversary is defined as
A , [A[0], A[1], . . . A[n − 1]]. The process A is stationary
because it is fully determined by the stationary process Y .
B. Entropy and Entropy Rate of Y
Lemma 1 Let Y be the label process as given in Def. 5.
For n ≥ 1, limδs→0H(Y ) = −
∑m
i=1
1
m log2m = log2m
and limδs→∞H(Y ) = −
∑mn
i=1
1
mn log2
1
mn = n log2m. For
n = 1, H(Y ) = log2m. For n = 2, H(Y ) = log2(m) −
(µp−1)m+1
µpm
log2(
(µp−1)m+1
µpm
)− m−1µpm log2( 1µpm ). For n = 3,
H(Y ) =m pixxx log2 pixxx + 2m(m− 1) pixxy log2 pixxy
+(m(m− 1)(m− 2) +m(m− 1)) pixyz log2 pixyz
with
pixxx =
1
m
µp − 2 + p1
µp
+
2
m2
(1− p1)
µp
+
1
m3
p1
µp
,
pixyy =
1
m2
(1− p1)
µp
+
1
m3
p1
µp
, pixyz =
1
m3
p1
µp
.
Finally, the entropy rate H(Y ) is given by
H(Y ) = H({qi}) + log2(m− 1)
µq
,
where q and µq are defined as follows. Define p(x) =∑∞
i=1 pix
i. Let q(x) = p(x) m−1m−p(x) . Let {qi} denote the
corresponding probabilities, i.e., develop q(x) as a Taylor
series around x = 0. Let H({qi}) be the entropy of {qi} as
stated in Def. 1 and let µq =
∑
iqi.
Proof: Due to space constraints let us only give the
proof for the entropy rate since this is the most fundamental
quantity. We compute the entropy rate via the expression
limn→∞ 1nH(Y [1], Y [2], . . . , Y [n]). Consider a large block
length n. Our label process has two degrees of freedom. First,
there is the degree of freedom of how the block length n
is partitioned into smaller segments. This comes from the
connectivity pattern. Second, for each small segment of the
partitioning we have the degree of freedom of how to label
this segment with an element from M. These two degrees of
freedom are however not independent. When a user switches
a base station she picks a new label. But it might happen
that the new label is identical to the old one. Therefore, from
the process Y we cannot in general identify the times a user
switches base stations.
Let us therefore consider an equivalent process in which
these two degrees of freedom are cleanly separated. Any
time a user switches a base station she has a 1/m chance
of picking an identical label. Let us therefore redefine the
inter-arrival times by joining those segments that have the
same label together. Recall that{pi} denotes the probabilities
of the inter-arrival times Ui. Define p(x) =
∑∞
i=1 pix
i. Let
q(x) = p(x) m−1m−p(x) . Let {qi} denote corresponding probabil-
ities, i.e. develop q(x) as a Taylor series around 0.
Consider now a new label process that has inter-arrival times
distributed according to {qi}. For this process, every time a
user switches, the new label is chosen uniformly at random
from the set M excluding the old label. In other words, the
label is chosen uniformly at random from a set of size m− 1.
Assume now that we pick k segments according to {qi},
where k is very large. Roughly kqi of those segments will
have length i, so the total length will be close to
∑
i≥1 qii =
µq . There are approximately 2kH({qi}) such arrangements and
these arrangements are roughly equally probable. Further, for
each of these arrangement we can still decide on the labels
which adds (m − 1)k degrees of freedom. The total number
of (roughly equally likely) arrangements is therefore
2kH({qi})(m− 1)k = 2k[H({qi})+log2(m−1)].
Taking the logarithm, and dividing by the expected length kµq
in order to get the entropy per symbol, gives the stated result.
Discussion. We have only given entropy expressions for n =
1, 2, and 3. Although it is possible to derive expressions for
larger n as well, as discussed in Sec. II, the operationally
most significant quantity is the entropy rate. In the following
we examine how this quantity behaves as a function of the
systems parameters.
For either small or large values of δs it is easy to give
accurate and simple expressions for the entropy rate. Consider
first not too large values of δs. In this case the entropy rate
is dominated by the randomness inherent in the “timing”, i.e.,
by the term H({qi}) and we can ignore the entropy contained
in the labels, i.e., the term log2(m). Further, the term µqδs
is roughly constant since it represents the average amount of
time (in seconds) that it takes to switch labels and this time
only depends in second order on the sampling interval (i.e.,
on δs). Finally, for small values of δs, H({qi}) is increased
by 1 bit every time we half the value of δs. If follows that
the entropy rate (per second) has in this regime the expression
a − b log2(δs). E.g., for the Lausanne scenario, that we will
introduce in Sec. V, we have a ≈ 0.12 and b ≈ 1/70. In
particular this means that the entropy rate tends to infinity if
we let δs tend to 0. But of course, small δs comes at the cost
of a large overhead; moreover, in every system the value of δs
is lower bounded by the inherent timing accuracy which we
can achieve.
For very large values of δs the entropy is eventually dom-
inated by the term log(m). Further, for large values of δs,
µq converges to 1. Therefore, in this regime the secrecy rate
scales like log(m)/δs.
7Scenario Lausanne Los Angeles
Dimensions 6 ∗ 6km 35 ∗ 35km
Distance between streets 0.3km 1km
Number of basestations 100 9520
Max. speed 17m/s 34m/s
Number of cars per simulation 480 ∗ 30 840 ∗ 30
Entry rate 20 ∗ 4cars/20sec 35 ∗ 4/10sec
Table I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Note finally, that if we scale the size of all cells by a factor
α (or alternative, speed up cars by a factor 1/α), and at the
same time scale δs by α as well, then the entropy rate scales
by a factor 1/α. So small cell sizes increase the entropy as
one would expect.
C. Entropy and Entropy Rate of Y under Adversarial Model
Lemma 2 Assume that A is a renewal process as stated in
Def. 6. The amount of information a user can hide from the
adversary is characterized by
H(Y |A) = H(Y,A)−H(A) = H(Y )−H(A). (4)
Recall that the adversary can control a fraction 1m
of all basestations. Define h2(x) = −x log2(x) −
(1 − x) log2(1 − x). For all vector length n ∈
N, limδs→0H(A) = h2( 1m ). and limδs→∞H(A) =
−∑ni=1 (ni) ( 1m)i (m−1m )n−i log2 ( 1m)i (m−1m )n−i. For n =
1, H(A) = h2( 1m ). For n = 2, H(A) = h2(
1
m ) + h2(
1
mµp
) +
h2(
m−1
mµp
). Finally, the entropy rate H(A) is given by
H(A) = H({qi}) +H({ri})
µq + µr
,
where q and µq are given in Lemma 1 and where r and µr are
defined as follows. Let r(x) = p(x)m−(m−1)p(x) . Let {ri} denote
the corresponding probabilities, i.e., develop r(x) as a Taylor
series around x = 0. Let H({ri}) be the entropy of {ri} as
stated in Def. 1 and let µr =
∑
iri.
Due to space constraints we skip the proof of the above lemma.
We note that for small to moderate values of δs the entropy
rate of A also has the form a− b log2(δs) as was the case for
the entropy rate of Y .
V. EVALUATION
A. Methodology
Testing environment: We test the performance of our
protocol for the case of mobile users in cars. We produce
data close to natural user behavior by using the SUMO
traffic simulator [12]. SUMO generates routes that mimic the
expected user behavior by using an algorithm called dynamic
user assignment. It reflects the idea that traveling involves
some time, cost or disutility that users would prefer to avoid. In
essence, this algorithm finds the quickest route instead of the
shortest path. We consider two types of underlying topology
and traffic density:
1) the Lausanne scenario representing traffic in a small
town, and
2) the Los Angeles scenario, representing traffic in a
metropolitan area with a network of highways.
In place of maps, we use simplified square grids networks with
parameters corresponding to those of the two cities. All streets
have the same length, the same number of lanes per direction
and the same speed limit. The crossings are set according to
the right-before-left-rule without traffic lights. The simulated
area is covered by square cells of the same size, each cell
served by a basestation. In the simulations, each basestation
is randomly assigned one of four different labels; thus each
label is assigned to roughly 25% of the base stations. Each
car enters and exits this area at a randomly chosen border
point. The precise parameters for the two scenario are listed
in Table I.
Adversary: An adversary present in the system might be
able to overhear some information as explained in Sec. II-B,
and thus reduce the amount of collected random bits that can
be used for key generation. Our main model consists of a
strong adversary who can overhear all parts of the trace
corresponding to a specific label; in the simulations we also
consider a weak adversary who only knows the positions in the
trace where the user is connected to one specific basestation.
Validation of theoretical model : To validate our mod-
eling and analysis in Sec. IV, we empirically calculate the
distribution of the sojourn times using our simulations, and
use this distribution as input for our theoretical model. We
then compare the theoretically derived performance from the
model with that of the simulated system.
Performance metrics: Our performance metric is the
secrecy rate Rs, that quantifies the number of generated
random bits per second. In the presence of an adversary, this
quantifies the number of random bits the adversary has no
information about. For traces of length n, Rs is calculated
as H(X)nδs , where H(X) is computed from the simulations as
described in the following. For the theoretical results, we use
Rs =
H(Y )
nδs
, where H(Y ) is calculated using our modeling.
As n increases, this quantity approaches H(Y )δs . Similarly, in
the presence of the adversary we use H(X|A)nδs and
H(Y |A)
δs
.
Entropy computation and a practical challenge: For a
fixed trace length n the entropy can be computed based on
simulations in the following way. Lets say, we have generated
a collection of vectors X from traces of all users in the system.
This in turn allows us to estimate the probability distribution
on the set of possible outcome vectors. We can then compute
the entropy associated to this probability distribution.
In practice, this approach quickly reaches its limits. We need
to calculate the distribution on the setMn, which has cardinal-
ity mn. A realistic assumption would be to have approximately
100 micro cells in an 6km ∗6km large urban street area; if
a car spends approximately 5mins in this area, and we use
δt = 20sec, the trace length would be approximately n = 15.
Even if we assume that we only use m = 4 labels, i.e., we set
m = 4 in order to reduce complexity, we still have to estimate
8a probability distribution on a set of size 415 = 230, which is
roughly a billion. This quickly becomes close to infeasible
or at least impractical as m and n increase, and limits the
scenario we can examine through simulations. This is where
the theoretical modeling can help.
B. Results
Figure 2(a) shows the performance of our protocol as
function of the sampling interval δs for the case of the
Lausanne-scenario. We plot both the results obtained through
simulations (dotted curves) as well as the results obtained from
the theoretical model (continuous curves). Our simulations
provided results for trace lengths n = 2, n = 3, n = 4, n = 6
and n = 8; we see that these results fit quite well to the curves
derived from the theoretical model. We thus proceed to use the
theoretical model to derive the upper and lower bound curves
also depicted in the figure, which correspond to vector lengths
n = 1 and n → ∞, respectively. The latter is derived using
the entropy rate, as we discussed earlier.
We see that as the trace length n grows, the curves converge
towards the entropy rate (which, as we discussed earlier, gives
a lower bound for any length): in fact we closely approach this
curve even for relatively short length, e.g., n = 8. Curves for
shorter length seem to deliver higher secrecy rates; however,
this is misleading since these computation only apply if we
collect a set of such vectors which are well separated but loose
their meaning if we sample consecutive vectors due to the
dependence of such vectors. Thus, the entropy rate gives a
more realistic estimate of the performance we can expect to
achieve. For example, in the Lausanne scenario, we expect to
collect 128 random bits in approx. 25 minutes, if we sample
three times per minute, while in the Los Angeles scenario we
expect to collect 128 in approx. 15 minutes, if we double the
sampling rate.
The remaining plots in Fig. 2 show the effect that the
presence of a strong or a weak adversary has in the achievable
secrecy rate. Note that the weak adversary, which is a very
realistic case (an adversary overhearing all communications
in a single basestation) has a negligible effect; the strong
adversary, on the other hand, reduces the secrecy rate by
approx. 40%. Indeed, such an adversary, by overhearing all
communications in 25% of the basestations can deduce also
much about about the conversation in between. To consider an
extreme case consider the example of m = 2. In this case the
strong adversary, by observing have the positions can in fact
reconstruct the whole trace.
VI. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
A. Related Work
Limitations of traditional key management, notably those
based on public key cryptography, spurred work that sought
alternative methods to establish symmetric shared keys. The
motivation has been to avoid trusted third parties and public
key cryptography (e.g., Diffie-Hellman secret key establish-
ment [13] that relies on the computational hardness of the
discrete logarithm problem. Information-theoretic schemes for
key generation based on correlated information have been the
basis: simply put, two legitimate parties observe a source the
adversary cannot even if it can intercept messages they ex-
change [14], [15]. The adversary can be a passive eavesdropper
(as is also the case for the DH protocol), and the possibility
of key establishment in the presence of active adversaries is
proven [16], [17], [2].
Advances mobile computing were a catalyst, as small-
footprint wireless platforms need to set up keys often with
peers in an ad hoc manner. A range of schemes were proposed,
leveraging the wireless channel properties to establish common
information an eavesdropper is highly unlikely to obtain.
Its reciprocity (radio wave propagation effects are the same
in both wireless link directions) and the time (the channel
changes over time) and spatial (it is uncorrelated for any two
receivers more than few wavelengths apart) variability of the
wireless channel make this possible: Alice and Bob can make
channel measurements that Eve is practically unable to obtain.
The early [18] proposed transmission of tones across an urban
UHF channel, and other more recent methods followed.
Relying on Received Signal Strength (RSS) measurements,
special care is needed to address the asymmetries of this
statistic (the RSS is not the same in both directions). A three-
way message exchange and sampling of the signal envelope
was proposed in [19]; extracting randomness from deep fades
in [20], along with information reconciliation techniques to
securely correct inconsistencies; a level-crossing algorithm
in [21], to trace channel impulse response estimates within
an index, and an 802.11 implementation-based evaluation;
also experimental implementation-based evaluation of various
secrecy extraction techniques for 802.11 and an environment-
adaptive improvements in [22]; a solution geared towards
reduced energy consumption in wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) and IEEE 802.15.4 compliant radios in [23]. [24] re-
lies on the ultra-wide band (UWB) pulse response to derive an
approximation and an upper bound of the mutual information
for a general channel model; [25] relies on the UWB channel
delay profiles. Observing that low channel variability can
reduce the extracted information, special-purpose hardware,
variable-directional antennas, and beam-forming techniques
were proposed in [26], [27]. Phase reciprocity [28], and
differential phase between tones [29] were also proposed.
Works leveraging the physical layer may require special
hardware or modification of the wireless transceivers, at least
in their ability to provide specific measurements. More impor-
tant, even though they can offer significant secrecy rates (e.g.,
10 bits/s by [30]), they are limited in their pair-wise and local
operation (relying mostly on short-range radios). Without any
transceiver modification, two devices could extract common
information by track of the ’one time frames,’ that is, wireless
transmissions received at the first attempt (no retransmission)
[3]; an eavesdropping adversary would need to eavesdrop all
wireless transmissions for an extended period of time without
errors.
But none of the above allows two remote devices that are
not connected across the wireless medium to establish a shared
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Figure 2. Lausanne scenario (a) without adversary and (b) with strong adversary, Los Angeles scenario (c) without adversary and (d) with strong adversary
(for parameters see Tab. I).
key. This would be the case for a broad gamut of mobile
applications beyond than what ad hoc 802.11, WSN, or UWB
links can support. Our work seeks to close this gap. We
propose an alternative mechanism independent of the wireless
communication specifics, leveraging node mobility and the
traces of their connectivity to wireless infrastructure; a scheme
deployable on top of existing systems with no modification of
transceivers.
B. Discussion
Our base position in this paper is that mobility has inherent
randomness that can be exploited to establish common random
bits at low cost. This observation is not constrained to a
specific application or system. We exploited the interactions
of the cellular infrastructure with users driving in a geop-
graphical area; we could instead have considered pedestrian
users connecting to femtocells, or even Internet users browsing
webpages managed by a common server. We proposed a pro-
tocol that builds on the times of encounters with basestations;
we could instead capitulate on encounters with other users as
recorded by a satellite, speed at particular instances as mea-
sured by traffic infrastucture or any other mobility triggered
random event witnessed by two independent entitities. We
utilized the random bits for secret key generation; we could
instead have addressed privacy considerations. For example,
the common random bits could be used to establish a type
of unique identity for a user, which cannot be taken over by
any other; this would allow the user to reap the benefits of a
stable, recurring interaction when needed, while, at the same
time, not revealing her long-term identity.
The particular scheme we selected to examine is we believe
very promising, not because it yields very high data rates,
but because it operates at very low cost. Indeed, the mobility
scenaria we investigated establish 128 bit secret keys in 15-
25 minutes, which might at first seem long; however, this
is well below the average daily commute time for many
users, while the overall operation requires collection of 3− 6
samples per minute, a very low overhead for the capabilities of
current mobile devices, that need not disrupt their main tasks.
These almost “free” random bits can be used to enhance and
complement other security systems, when needed.
Interestingly, we also find this simple scheme robust to
adversarial attacks. Systems such as cellular networks or Wi-Fi
infrastructures are well protected and centrally managed, with
any intrusion or malfunction detected by their administrator. A
passive eavesdropper can compromise an I node by ’tapping
on’ such a node, possibly indefinitely long, or by establishing
an adversarial receiver in the vicinity of the I node, and
ensuring that all communications between any V and that I
node are received by the adversary. Clearly, both are hard to
achieve for the adversary,3 even for a single I node; nonethe-
less our scheme is operational even with a good fraction
of them compromised. Moreover, a natural constraint stems
from the inability of the adversary to be physically present
throughout the system area and monitor (or compromise) all
I nodes. If it could do so, it could deploy its own infrastructure
or it could override all defenses of the infrastructure. An
active eavesdropper, i.e., an adversary that injects messages,
is orthogonal to our investigation, as we are not making any
assumptions on prior trust and security associations between
the mobile nodes and the infrastructure. Clearly, injection of
arbitrary messages, for example, by a compromised I node
or by impersonation of an I node could result in a failure of
our protocol, i.e., the establishment of a shared key, KS,V ,
between the mobile and the infrastructure. This cannot benefit
the adversary: he could instead simply jam communications
and erase messages.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a protocol that leverages mobility for secret
key generation, and evaluated its performance through mod-
eling and simulation results. Although simple, our scheme
can be implemented with low overhead, and is robust to
adversaries.
REFERENCES
[1] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. Wiley,
2006.
[2] U. Maurer and S. Wolf, “Secret-key agreement over unauthenticated
public channels: Privacy amplification,” IEEE Transactions on Informa-
tion Theory, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 839–851, April 2003.
[3] S. Xiao, W. Gong, and D. Towsley, “Secure Wireless Communication
with Dynamic Secrets,” in IEEE INFOCOM, 2010.
3Compromising well-managed infrastructure is not easy, while receiving
all transmissions within a range, in a multi-access, interference limited
environment, is not under the control of the receiver.
10
[4] C. Bennett, G. Brassard, and U. Maurer, “Generalized privacy amplifica-
tion,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 41, pp. 1915–1923,
1995.
[5] J. Carter and M. Wegman, “Universal classes of hash functions,” Journal
of Computer and System Sciences, no. 18, pp. 396–407, 1997.
[6] S. Halevi and H. Krawczyk, “Strengthening digital signatures via
randomized hashing,” in Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 2006, LNCS
4117. Springer, 2005, pp. 41–59.
[7] “National Institute of Standards and Technology,” www.nist.gov.
[8] “GSM world association,” www.gsmworld.com.
[9] “ETSI GPRS,” www.etsi.org.
[10] “UMTS,” www.umtsworld.com.
[11] M. Ficek, T. Pop, P. Vla´cˇil, K. K. Dufkova´, L. Kencl, and M. Tomek,
“Performance study of active tracking in a cellular network using a
modular signaling platform,” in ACM MobiSys, Jun. 2010.
[12] D. Krajzewicz, M. Bonert, and P. Wagner, “The Open Source Traffic
Simulation Package - SUMO,” 2006.
[13] W. Diffie and M. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, Nov.
1976.
[14] R. Ahlswede and I. Csiszar, “Common randomness in information theory
and cryptography. i. secret sharing,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1121–1132, Jul. 1993.
[15] U. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common
information,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 39, no. 3,
pp. 733–742, May 1993.
[16] U. Maurer and S. Wolf, “Secret-key agreement over unauthenticated
public channels: Definitions and a completeness result,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 822–831, April 2003.
[17] ——, “Secret-key agreement over unauthenticated public channels: The
simulatability condition,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 832–838, April 2003.
[18] J. Hershey, A. Hassan, and R. Yarlagadda, “Unconventional crypto-
graphic keying variable management,” IEEE Transactions on Commu-
nications, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 3–6, Jan. 1995.
[19] M. Tope and J. McEachen, “Unconditionally secure communications
over fading channels,” in IEEE MILCOM, vol. 1, 2001, pp. 54–58.
[20] B. Azimi-Sadjadi, A. Kiayias, A. Mercado, and B. Yener, “Robust key
generation from signal envelopes in wireless networks,” in ACM CCS,
Alexandria, Virginia, USA, 2007.
[21] S. Mathur, W. Trappe, N. Mandayam, C. Ye, and A. Reznik, “Radio-
telepathy: Extracting a Secret Key from an Unauthenticated Wireless
Channel,” in ACM MobiCom, San Francisco, CA, USA, Sept. 2008.
[22] S. Jana, S. Premnath, M. Clark, S. Kasera, N. Patwari, and S. Krish-
namurthy, “On the effectiveness of secret key extraction from wireless
signal strength in real environments,” in ACM MobiCom, Beijing, China,
Sept. 2009.
[23] J. Croft, N. Patwari, and S. Kasera, “Robust Uncorrelated Bit Extrac-
tion Methodologies for Wireless Sensors,” in ACM IPSN, Stockholm,
Sweden, Apr. 2010.
[24] R. Wilson, D. Tse, and R. Scholtz, “Channel identification: Secret
sharing using reciprocity in ultrawideband channels,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 364 –375, Sept.
2007.
[25] A. Kitaura, T. Sumi, K. Tachibana, H. Iwai, and H. Sasaoka, “A scheme
of private key agreement based on delay profiles in uwb systems,” in
IEEE Sarnoff Symposium, Princeton, NJ, USA, 27-28 2006.
[26] T. Aono, K. Higuchi, T. Ohira, B. Komiyama, and H. Sasaoka, “Wireless
secret key generation exploiting reactance-domain scalar response of
multipath fading channels,” IEEE Transactions on Antennas and Prop-
agation, vol. 53, no. 11, pp. 3776 – 3784, nov. 2005.
[27] T. Ohira, “Secret key generation exploiting antenna beam steering and
wave propagation reciprocity,” in European Microwave Conference,
vol. 1, 4-6 2005.
[28] H. Koorapaty, A. Hassan, and S. Chennakeshu, “Secure information
transmission for mobile radio,” IEEE Communications Letters, IEEE,
vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 52 –55, feb 2000.
[29] A. Sayeed and A. Perrig, “Secure wireless communications: Secret keys
through multipath,” in IEEE ICASSP, Las Vegas, NV, USA, March 2008.
[30] C. Ye, S. Mathur, A. Reznik, Y. Shah, W. Trappe, and N. Mandayam,
“Information-theoretically secret key generation for fading wireless
channels,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 240 –254, june 2010.
